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NOTES
REMEDIES OF A CREDITOR FOR SETTING ASIDE A
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES
Introduction
Alienations in fraud of creditors are a prolific source of conten-
tion in our 'courts and have been the subject of frequent legislative
supervision. In introducing the subject of what remedies are avail-
able to a creditor in his attempt to reach these secreted assets, it is
well to first trace the development of the legislative action and court
decisions concerning these remedies.
The tendency of legislation has been to prevent unfeeling creditors
from oppressing or punishing a debtor for his poverty,' but a strong
purpose is manifested in the more recent statutes and decisions of the
courts to enlarge and strengthen the creditor's remedies against the
property of his debtor.
2
Fraudulent alienations of property were of a very early origin. A
provision in the Magna Charta is sometimes spoken of as one of the
original sources of written law against fraudulent transfers. The
article provided that no freeman should give or sell away his lands so
that no residue would remain to the lord of the fee, out of which the
service pertaining to the fee might be enforced.8 Then came the
statutes of Richard II, Edward III, and Henry VII, all containing
provisions aimed at fraudulent debtors. The most famous and im-
portant statutes against fraudulent conveyances is that of 13 ] liza-
beth,4 largely re-enacted by 29 Elizabeth.5 These statutes in ex-
press language declared void all conveyances intended to defraud
creditors. The import of the statutes is that the conveyances would
be valid in respect to all other parties. In the United States, the
statute of Elizabeth has in practically all the states been either recog-
nized as a part of the common law or expressly enacted in more or
less similar terms.
By far the leading case on fraudulent conveyances coming down
after the Statute of Elizabeth, and around which have sprung up
some of the most conspicuous principles governing modern fraudu-
1. Stevens v. Merrill, 41 N. H. 309, 315 (1860).
2. Meredith v. Thompson, 4 Alaska 360, 370 (1906).
3. MAGN'A CHARTA, June 19, 1215.
4. St. 13 Eliz. c. 5,1570.
5. St. 29 Eliz. c. 5, 1587.
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lent transfers, was Twyne's Case, decided in 1601.6 That convey-
ance was set aside as fraudulent because there was a general gift
where the donor continued in possession and maintained a secret
trust with the donee,
The basic principles of Twyne's Case are still applied today, though
the transfers have become more involved.
Form of Remedies
In general, the creditor has three possible courses to follow where
the property has been fraudulently conveyed. These three remedies
are available in South Carolina and in those other states not having
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, which will be discussed
later in this article. First, the creditor may treat the property as
that of the transferor and levy execution thereon, leaving the put-
chaser to contest the title. Secondly, he may bring an action in equity
to set aside the conveyance as a cloud on his right to levy execution,
and have the transfer cancelled. Then the cteditor would levy in
the usual way. Lastly, but probably the most frequent used, is the
judgment creditor's bill which is brought to set aside the convey-
ance, then have the property sold by the receiver (if one exists),
and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
Next, it is important to consider what the courts have required
the creditor to do in order to take advantage of these remedies. The
leading case in South Carolina and one which includes a compre-
hensive view of the situation as it stands today is the case of Pemple
v. Montgomery,7 decided in 1930. One of the issues involved was
whether a creditor must exhaust his legal remedies before applying
to the court to have the conveyance set aside. More precisely, must
there be a return of a nulla bona after an execution. It was settled
in that case that in a creditor's action to set aside a debtor's deed
for legal fraud, an allegation and proof that the debt was reduced
to a judgment and a nulla bona returned on execution is essential.
Conversely, in an action to set aside a deed based on actual fraud,
no nulla bona was necessary nor a showing that the debt was reduced
to a judgment. The Temple case defines legal fraud as constructive,
unintended fraud and actual fraud as that which is positive or in-
tended. Quoted in the Temple case as part of the rationale in that
instance was an opinion of Mr. Justice Mclver in Jackson V. Leuds8
6. Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80 a, 76 Reprint 809, 5 ERC 2, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas.
1, 18 Amer. Law. Reg. N. S. 137 (1601).
7. Temple v. Montgomery, 157 S. C. 85, 153 S. E. 640 (1930).
8. Jackson v. Lewis, 34 S. C. 1, 12 S. E. 560 (1891).
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saying: ".... a voluntary deed [without consideration] may be set
aside at the instance of a creditor upon the grounds of constructive
or legal fraud even where there is not the slightest taint of actual
or moral fraud in the transaction, under the principle that the law
requires that one must be just before he is generous."
The creditor's bill, though the most commonly-used remedy is
not an ideal one. In using a creditor's bill a domestic judgment is
necessary except where it is impossible to get jurisdiction for a do-
mestic judgment.9
In a further examination of the cases we find that where there
was an action to set aside an assignment for the benefit of creditors,
only those creditors who had sued out on their judgment and had a
nulla bona returned were entitled to institute the action. 10 In an
action to set aside a deed from husband to wife, an allegation of a
nulla bona return was held not necessary." The strongest au-
thority against the necessity of a nulla bona return is perhaps the
case of Burch v. Brantley,1 2 in which Justice Simpson lumps all
fraud in one category, saying: "An allegation of nulla bona re-
turn is unnecessary, but for a creditor to vacate a conveyance based
on fraud, he must allege and prove that fraud existed, but a return
of a nulla bona constitutes no part of such fraud."
Where Fraudulent Grantee Has Conveyed to Innocent Purchaser
The creditor can levy an attachment only on the identical property
which the grantee has received under the fraudulent conveyance.' 8
The question of what remedy is available to a creditor where the
debtor's fraudulent grantee has disposed of the property to an in-
nocent purchaser is an open one in most jurisdictions. It is widely
accepted that once the fraudulent grantee has done this, neither the
property itself nor the proceeds of the property received in exchange
nor property in which the proceeds are invested are subject to attach-
ment, in the absence of statute.14 Some cases have vaguely alluded
to a remedy in equity, but the authorities seem to have left the credi-
tors to whistle for their money in this event.
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act
In twenty states, not including South Carolina, the Uniform Frau-
9. Penning v. Reid, 166 S. E. 139 (S. C. 1932).
10. Rytenberg v. Keels, 39 S. C. 203, 17 S. E. 441 (1893).
11. Dennis v. McKnight, 161 S. C. 209, 159 S. E. 555 (1931).
12. Burch v. Brantley, 20 S. C. 503 (1883).
13. Post v. Bird, 28 Fla. 1, 9 So. 888 (1891); Accord: Rutledge v. Evans,
11 Iowa 287; Lanning v. Streeter, 57 Barb. N. Y. 33.
14. Post v. Bird, Note 13 supra.
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dulent Conveyances Act has been adopted. This act as it has been
applied in those jurisdictions, and by its language, is considerably
more advantageous to the creditor than the law in effect elsewhere.
Briefly, there is one provision of the Act which differs materially
from that which is required in other jurisdictions in order to have
a conveyance set aside. Section 5 of the original Act embodies the
following provision: "Every conveyance made without fair con-
sideration when the person making it is engaged or about to be en-
gaged in a business or transaction for which the property remaining
in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become
creditors during the continuance of such business without regard
to his actual intent."1 5
Now the question logically presented is, does this act enhance or
impair the remedies of the creditor? In Minnesota where the act
is in force this question has been presented. The issues arose around
two troublesome problems confronted frequently by creditors in the
past. They were: (1) Could the plaintiff have assailed the trans-
fer before he obtained a judgment, and if so, was he obliged to pur-
sue such a course under penalty of the statute of limitations running
from the time the transfer could first be impeached? (2) Does the
act abolish the time-honored practice of securing judgment and hav-
ing execution returned unsatisfied before bringing suit to set aside
a fraudulent conveyance?16 The court answered saying:
The definition of creditor [under their act] is clearly broad
enough to embrace a party without a judgment. Section 848417
grants to a creditor whose claim has not matured the right to
apply to the court to set aside a fraudulent transfer by his debtor.
Obviously such a proceeding could not be predicated upon a
judgment. It does not seem sensible to say that a creditor whose
claim has matured should be in any less advantageous position.
The whole purpose of the enactment is aimed at the dishonest
debtor and seeks to provide an orderly, efficient, and speedy
remedy for the creditor.
In New York, Chief Judge Cardozo in a case very similar in its
issues to the Minnesota case applies the Act in the same way. "The
uniform act in its definition of a creditor seeks a rule of uniformity,
15. § 5, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. The Uniform Laws. Em-
phasis supplied.
16. Lind v. Johnson, 204 Minn. 30, 282 N. W. 661 (1938).
17. MSA SS 513.20-513.32, MINN. LAWS.
1953] Noms
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and in so doing levels distinctions that at times have been the refuge
of the dilatory debtor." I s
The Minnesota court proceeds and the fury seems to mount against
the dilatory debtor. "After all the fraudulent grantor cannot com-
plain, for as to him the obligation is a subsisting one until the statu-
tory period has run against the judgment. As to his grantee, who
holds only an apparent title, a mere cloak under which is hidden the
hideous skeleton of deceit, the real owner being the scheming and
shifty judgment debtor, what reason has he to complain when the six
year statute giving repose to the remedy has not expired since the entry
of judgment."1 9
There is authority to the effect that a judgment at law is a prere-
quisite to a proceeding in equity under the Act,20 but American
Surety Co. v. Conner is the leading authority to the effect that a
judgment at law is unnecessary to attack under the Uniform Act,
2 1
and is generally followed in most jurisdictions.
Conclusion
In a fieId as broad as fraudulent conveyances, with the always con-
flicting interests of the debtor on one hand and the creditor on the
other, there is to be expected a constant search by the debtor for legal
and sometimes illegal means of placing his assets outside the reach
of his creditor. Add to this the shift of economic tides when the
class of debtors may either be subjected to harsh criticism for their
attempts to emerge from a given transaction with something more
than their proverbial shirts, or when they may be the beneficiary of
a rush of public sympathy for their plight. Meanwhile the creditors'
purpose, and logically so, is to reach these secreted assets. He must
conform to the proper procedure and avoid the pitfalls that will
surely be placed in his course. It has been seen that the rights or
remedies available to a creditor in this jurisdiction and those others
not having adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act are
limited to three, and in each there are certain difficulties which can
prevent him from accomplishing his purpose. One is that generally
only existing creditors can attack a conveyance as fraudulent. Sub-
sequent creditors may attack if they can show an actual intent to
defraud them also. A creditor must examine the type of fraud em-
ployed in the transfer, as he would be required to exhaust his legal
18. American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N. Y. 1, 7, 166 N. E. 783, 785 (1929).
19. Lind v. Johnson, note 16 mipra.
20. Lippman v. Manger, 185 Wis. 63,200 N. W. 663 (1924).
21. American Surety Co. v. Conner, note 18 supra.
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remedies and show a nulla bona return in the case of constructive
fraud and will find it necessary if he could show actual fraud. The
creditor proceeds at his peril on this point.
Only under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act is there
a positive course which the creditor may follow, and from this stand-
point alone it is highly desirable. The inference is that the other
jurisdictions would do well to adopt this Act, but there are certain
other vital considerations involved. The conclusion follows natur-
ally that the effectiveness of the remedies available to the creditor
are in jurisdictions not having the Uniform Act severely limited by
unnecessary formal requirements, and on the basis of that we find the
creditor in something less than an enviable position, once his debtor
has made his questionable transfers.
Recommendations
Since it is by no means definite or certain what remedy it is best
for a creditor to choose in setting aside a fraudulent conveyance in
South Carolina and a number of other jurisdictions, some legislation
establishing a well-defined course is needed. The Statute of Eliza-
beth goes no further than to declare certain transfers void. The
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act is ideal in some respects, yet
contains language which in effect can make it very risky for anyone
owing obligations, or about to engage in business with small capital,
to convey anything, regardless of motive. That means that the mo-
tives of the debtor are impugned, and a valid gift could later be
attacked, by one not a creditor at the time of the gift. Therefore, in
drawing up a statute which could clarify the situation, the legitimate
interests of debtors and creditors should be carefully weighed. Every
effort should be made, however, to divorce the proposed act from
prejudices against or sympathies for either debtors or creditors as a
class. Proceeding from there, it would seem wise to draw the act
along the general lines of the Uniform Act, modifying certain sec-
tions and incorporating the Statute of Elizabeth. The prime con-
sideration should be to prescribe a course for the creditor to follow,
keeping in mind the decisions of the courts and the workability of
the proposed statute.
It is difficult to specifically recommend this or that change in the
law as it has been laid down, since the quarrel is not with the law
but with the fact that it is far from clear to the creditor what pro-
cedure he must or should follow in setting aside the conveyance. So
1953]
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the recommendation is, stated simply, "Show him the way." Set out
a form of procedure which he can follow, codifying the transfers
made void by the Statute of Elizabeth and the remedies used in the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act.
RobeRT DUPE.
7
DuPre: Remedies of a Creditor for Setting Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
